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Economic analysis of tort law: A comparative
survey'
HANS-BERND SCHAFER

This paper on the economic analysis of tort law examines the rules of civil actionespecially those of the accident law regarding their suitability for optimum exploitation of
meagre economic resources. It examines the efficiency of legal rules. Important
contributions have been made in these areas by the work of Calabresi, Shavell, Landes,
Posner and in the German publications
by Adams.2 They have contributed
in
understanding the effects of pertinent legal rules which suitably interpret both jurisdiction
as well as legislation.
A knowledge of the Coase-Theorem3 was an important pre-condition for the
development of this research area. It states that varying, but clearly specified and
transferable legal rules do not influence the efficiency and type of resource utilisation, if
the transaction costs, i.e., the costs of subrogation of rights and legal enforcement are
equal to zero. This theorem has significantly influenced research work. Thus the efficiency
analysis of the rules of tort law should arrive at varying results, if on the one hand,
commercial relationships are present between the culprit and the victim, but on the other,
no transactions are possible. (culprit term is intended to mean tort-feasor) in the first
case, the original legal positions can be varied commercially, but certainly not in the
second case. Thus, the rules of legal orders are directly and exclusively decisive for the
behaviour of those involved, for accident frequency and damage prevention.
The following articles will discuss such damages, which occur without an
intervention of a commercial relationship between the culprit and the victim. It will
initially deal with a one-sided cause of damage4 only the culprit influences the extent of
damage. Subsequently, it deals with mutual damage causing5-not on the finall y resulting
extent of damage. Thus we differentiate with regard to two instruments of damage
prevention6: the exercise of caution while being involved in an action and the number of
such acts themselves (the activity level). Subsequently, a few more observations will be
made on the efficiency of the tort law within the scope of the commercial relationship.
This paper informs the reader about the literature position, especially with regard to the
efficiency of civil rights in accidental law. But it is conceptualised in such a manner, that
each important idea is also made to make the article comprehensible, especially to readers
with a legal background ..
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Translated from German manuscript. Abridged and revised omitting complicated equations and
tables- ed.
Adams (1983) and (1985), Calabresi (1972), Posner (1986), Coase (1960).
Coase (1960).
Posner (1972).
Demsetz (1972).
Shavell (1987).
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A. One-sided

cause of damage

A.1 Damage

prevention

A .1.1 The influence

by

exercising

care

of the court, culprit and victim

This first meaningful step towards an economic analysis of efficient exercising of
care was originally and notably taken by a practical person, the American judge Learned
Hand. I In a certain damage suit, in which the liability depended on the negligence of the
defendant, Learned Hand concluded as follows: In the determination of obligations
regarding exercising of care, our duty is to figure out whether the cost expenditure
necessary to prevent a damage is greater or smaller than the damages to be expected. He
expressed his ideas in a formula:
V. qS (Learned Hand Criterion)
Upon fulfilling of this condition, a negligent behaviour of the culprit can be assumed. In
such a case, 'V' is the preventive expenditure brought about by the culprit, 'q' is the
probability of damage initiation and'S' is the extent of damage caused in case the damage
does take place. It is quite meaningless to incur preventive expenditures, which are higher
than the expected value of the damage (qs). Furthermore, the culprit gets a material
incentive if he is made liable, to utilise the necessary preventive expenditure, so long as
his preventive expenditure lies below the expected value of the damage. These
considerations were later2 generalised and incorporated in a more extensive framework of
analysis.

Method

of observation

based on economics

Let us consider the example of a roofer who is reroofing his own home.3 The
economical overall effects of this process consist, on the one hand, in the profit excess,
which the roofer gets after subtracting his opportunity costs from the new roof. Damages
occur in case of the third party, because during bad weather, tiles can get loosened and fall
on the heads of passers-by thereby injuring them. The extent of these damages can,
however be controlled by preventive expenditures of the roofer. The profit excess should
be positive for the roofer in case of rational behaviour. Its quantity will not be further
examined here, but for case where no preventive expenditure was involved, we shall
arbitrarily set the value at 100. The roofer has various possibilities of influencing the
danger of an accident. The costs for each of the accident prevention activities are set at 10.
The overall effects of the safety measures under consideration of damages to the accident
victim can be read off from the following table for alternative preventive levels in serial
order of their effectivity.

=> => =>

1.

United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159F. 2dl69 (2d Cir, 1947). Here, however, il is especially
poinled out thai even in the last decades of the 19th century, especially in Germany, an intensive
discussion had taken place on the consequences of the civil rights liability, e.g. Jhering.

2.

Posner (1987), Diamond (1974), Adams (1985).

3.

Conventionally,
house-owners
and
Their common profit excess consisls
of the roofer. Since the problem of
will not be examined here, we shall

r'

roofers may be different persons, who make a mutual contract.
of the consumer's rent of Ihe house-owner and the producer's rent
distribuJion of the overall profit excess on both these components
ignore the existence of the contract.
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Table 1 clearly shows that the efficient preventive level is the wiring of tiles and the
inspection of the tile pins before placement Every other preventive level is inefficient. It
can also be clearly seen that the Learned Hand criterion describes the optimal preventive
expenditure only in a marginalized form. It is efficient to utilise an additional resources
unit only so long as its costs still lie below the value of the damages avoided by it. Thus
the transition from preventive level (2) to (3) causes additional preventive costs to the
tune of 10 for a damage reduction of 25. A further transition to (4) with the same cost
increase results only in a damage reduction of 4, and therefore, does not satisfy J,he
Learned Hand criterion, although in case of this preventive expenditure, the total caution
.expenditure of 30 is still lower than the expected damage of 31.

Efficiency

or liability

rules

The knowledge of the efficient level of care facilitates the testing of the question as to
whether or not civil liability rules are suitable to offer incentives to realise this level. For
this reason, we are investigating the victim's liability the negligence liability and the
absolute liability.
In case of the victim's liability,! the economically optimal liability level is only then
reached, when the damage causer undertakes the efficient preventive expenditure out of a
sense of obligation or out of sympathy with the victim. If the damage causers behave
rationally and egoistically-at
least as the economic theory leads us to believe, then they
usually do not undertake the efficient expenditure. Therefore, the victim's liability results
in a sub-optimal preventive expenditure when we make use of the economic behaviour
hypothesis. The roof tiles are mounted without inspecting the anchoring pins.
In case of liability due to negligence, the courts specify a care standard through the
highest jurisdiction, the adoption of which frees the culprit from any liability. Nonadoption of the same results in a compensation of such a damage, which is additionally
caused due to the violation of the cars obligation. Whether this case standard conveys an
incentive to a culprit, to adopt efficient precautions depends on whether the courts specify
the efficient preventive expenditure. If they specify the preventive expenditure to be too
low, then only a sub-optimal preventive level is achieved by the profit-maximizing

1.

The BGB (Burgerliches GeselZbuch) has a provision for purely victim liability especially in the area
of non-material damages (Article No. 253, BGB). lIowever, by jurisdiction, the liability for such
damages has been introduced especially in case of the personal legal violation, counter to the wording
of the law. Furthermore, damages due to avoidance of utilisation of resources, which were considered
as immaterial, were interpreted as property tort. (see Ott/Schafer (1986) p. 613 ff).
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culprit. If they specify the preventive level (2) given in the example, then the culprit is
going to maximize his profits to the tune of only 10 because of the cost of control. Thus
socially, a very low damage prevention expenditure is incurred. If the courts precisely
specify the socially optimal preventive expenditure, that is based on the example, if they
specify the care standard in such a manner, that the culprit is exempted from liability by
means of a thorough examination of the tiles and a simple wiring, then, these are also
incentives to incur this particular expenditure. In such a case, the liability due to
negligence is said to be efficient.
If in relation to the efficiency criterion, the courts specify too high a value for the
expenditure, then the culprit has an incentive, as per the example, to control the optimum
preventive level, and not the higher preventive level specified by the court. This is
because as a consequence he causes a damages claim of the victim to the tune of 35- 31=4.
If the culprit does not exceed the prescribed preventive level, he saves on damage
prevention costs to the tune of 10. Thus the profit form this behaviour is 6. This is
profitable for him and is socially efficient.
The Gennan Law expressly restricts the compensation to the specific differential
damages as per article No. 249 BGB. However, its detennination is only possible if the
violation of the case obligation effects an increase of the damage in an individual case, but
not if in case of a constant level, the negligence leads only to a variation of the damage
probabilities. In this case, it can no longer be recognized whether the accident initiation
has been caused by the violation of the care obligation or only due to a residual
probability still existing even in case of obligatory exercise of precautionary measures. In
this case, the courts only have the possibility to negate the causality of neglect of duty
for the damage, if the non-transgression
of the prescribed level of precaution only
insignificantly varies the probability of accident initiation.1 On the whole, we will be
able to notice that in case of non-utilisation
of the differential hypothesis, an
overstretching of the precautionary obligations offers incentives for an over-optimal
damage prevention. Only a proper specification of precautionary obligations creates the
efficient behavioural incentives in this case.
Courts have large-scale problems of infonnation during the determination of care
standards. Also, there exists an infonnation asymmetry between the court and the culprit,
which .cannot always be overcome even by an interrogation of the parties. In case of onesided damage-causing, the courts then prefer to fix the care standard preferably too high
than too low. This is because only in this manner, the damage prevention costs are
controlled to an efficient leveJ.2
In case of absolute liability, the culprit shall compensate the entire damage, quite
independent of his level of diligence. It is quite apparent, that the absolute liability results
in efficient precautionary measures in case of one-sided causing of damage. The profitmaximizing culprit will minimize the sum from damages and damage prevention costs.
This results in socially efficient precautionary expenditure, because the culprit is in the
same decision-making situation as the overall society. Furthennore, the absolute liability
economizes other costs in relation to the negligence liability. This is because it relieves,
the courts from the problematic search for care standards, which have to be specified in
case of the negligence liability.

1.

Weare grateful to our colleagues Ott and Von Rando for the suggestion.

2.

Kotz (1988).
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A.2 Damage prevention
A.2.1 The influence

by means of care and activity level control

of the court, the culprit and the victim

Damages can be influenced not only by means of expenditures on care, but also
through the level of damage-causing activity. A car driver, who uses optimal care, will
nevertheless cause an accident with a certain probability and this probability increases
with the number of kilometers travelled per annum that is to say, with the activity level
of the car driver. In many cases, the activity level of the culprit is not variable or is
variable only within narrow limits. The accident law can ignore this factor.l In other
cases, the activity level becomes the actually relevant parameter, a liability law which
would quite generally chose to dispense with trying to influence it would be inefficient

Method

of observation

based on economics

The determination of an economically optimal combination of care and activity levels
will again be demonstrated with the help of an example. Finally it will be shown as to
whether or not civil liability rules are suitable to offer incentives to achieve this
combination.
The scope of damages due to fire accidents and injuries which are caused by fire-work
rockets on New Year's day, depends on the one hand, on a painstaking care of dealing with
firework materials, but also on the other hand, on the number of rockets fired. In order to
answer the question, as to how many rockets someone is going to buy, it is first of all
important to understand the meaning of the law of reducing profit growth. With th~ New
Year rockets being available in large numbers, their use for the customers increases only
subproportionately. Correspondingly, he is inclined to pay lesser for the second packet of
rockets than for the first. For the third packet, his willingness to pay drops still further.
Let us assume that his willingness to spend for a packet or rocket fireworks is 9, for two
packets, 14, for three packets 16. The price of a packet is assumed to be 1. Upon the
purchase of one packet, he is going to achieve a profit excess of 8 (this is the difference
between his willingness to pay and the cost price). The purchase of two packets enables
him to make a profit excess of 12, that of 3 results in 13. It is furthermore presumed,
that the profit growth of one more packet is lower than the cost price, so that a maximum
of three packets of fireworks are,Purchased.
These cost-profit ideas do not as yet consider the amount of care to prevent damages
and those which could occur while releasing the rockets. Three possible levels of
exercising care are presumed. The firework items are directly fired at home without any
safety measures. This does not envisage any material or psychic costs of damage
prevention, but results in a damage expectation value (extent of damage in case it occurs,
multiplied by the damage probability) of 7 per packet of rockets fired (care level a). The
second, behavioural method connected with certain inconveniences is a firing of the
rockets in a personally owned distance from home, which requires a preventive
expenditure of 2 per packet. By this, the expected value of damage would sink to 3 (care
level b). Finally, it may be possible to fire the rockets in an open ground. By this the
expected damage per packet of rockets fired again reduces by a unit to 2 in case of further
cost expenditure (care level c). Thus we obtain a total of nine different possible states
from the three possible care levels and three possible activity levels from which the
optimal one is to be determined (see Table 2).

=> => =>

1.

Kotz (1988).
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TABLE 2

I
Profit excess
of the culprit

b34
26031c76892
packets

I

a7 -8
8 21
14
12
13
-2a1

-2-5

II
Extent of
expected
damages

ill
Profit excess
minus expected
value of
damage

while exercising care levels

a

In column I of Table 2, the figures indicate the profit excess of the utiliser of the
rockets in case of different (;are and activity levels. Columns II indicates the expected
damages. Column III finally shows the overall profits of the activity. The cost-profit
analysis thus obtained shows that the firing of one packet of rockets and the care level (b)
result in an efficient combination of care and activity levels. Because if this combination,
the difference between the profit excess of the culprit and the expected damage assumes a
highest value. Every other combination of care and activity level is inefficient against
this.
Efficiency

of liability

Tules

Initially, we shall examine the sole victim liability again. The culprit has no
material incentive to exercise any care. Therefore, he is going to select the lowest care
level (a). Furthermore, he is going to select the number of rocket packets according to'
whether the price of one more packet does not exceed his willingness to pay for it. This
case has been assumed in our example, that it happens in case of the third packet. In this
combination of maximum activity level and minimum care level of the culprit, even the
expected damage gets maximized. The profit maximizing behaviour of the culprit is
socially damaging on the whole, due to lack of any incentives.
In case of negligence liability, a different situation can be recognized. Let us first
assume that the courts are successful in recognizing the efficient care level and to convert
it into clearly defined behavioural regulations for the utilizer of firework items. In this
case, there are a sufficient number of incentives for the culprit to stick to the efficient care
level (b). The transition from (a) to (b), is rewarding for him in every activity level. This
is because whenever he sticks to the standard of care (b), he has to spend lesser on damage
prevention costs (in the sense of losses in profits), than he has to prevent an ominous
damage suit. Thus he will select the efficient care level (b) and is thus exempt from
liability. But what about the activity level of the culprit?
Table 2 clearly shows that the culprit reaches his highest profits with 8 if he
maintains the optimal care level (b) only if he fires 2 rocket packets. Thus this is an
activity level, which is socially too high. This is because it results in expected damages
of 6 and a social profit excess of only 2 as compared to 3, when both the activity as well
as the precautionary levels are efficient. Thus we reach the conclusion which is of utmost
importance for the evaluation of liability rules; the negligence liability in case of one-

tim
levels of the Culprit
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sided damage control by the culprit but with variable activity level, results in inefficiwt
results. But this only holds good, if the courts are successful in correctly specifying the
socially optimum preventive expenditure.
We can state as follows in a generalised manner: If the courts are successful in
finding and prescribing the efficient level of care, incentives are given to undertake
optimum care, but as a rule, the activity level is too high. In this case, the civil action
negligence liability alone cannot bring about any efficient damage control. A way out is
in the combination of civil action control of care level with police action control of the
activity level. Thus the sale of New Year fireworks can be authoritatively restricted and
the firing of the rockets can be limited to certain time periods.
Absolute liability results in an efficient damage control. Since every damage has to
be compensated, all damages are internalized. The individual economical calculus
corresponds to the overall social. The culprit should subtract the expected damages, since
they correspond to his liability expectation, from his profit excess, which still remains
with him after payment of the cost price and utilization of the damage prevention costs.
Thus the efficient care level (b) and the efficient activity level-use of a packet-are
achieved. Negligence liability and absolute liability, by the way, are skipped, if the care
level has been specified to be so high, that its maintenance reduces the damage
expectation to zero. Each infringement of diligence results in a full compensation.

B.l Damage prevention

by exercising

care

B.l.l The influence of the court, the culprit and the victim
B.l.2. Method of observation based on economics
Initially, we shall examine the case, in which the activity levels of the culprit and
victim are constant and the socially efficient state is dependent exclusively on a mutual
level of care. We can imagine the case of a farmer who drives from his field into the farm
through a public street and thus dirties the road with moist earth. Both he, and also the
endangered car driver can reduce the danger of an accident by means of different preveni.lve
measures.
The culprit and the victim undertake an economic activity each in the following
numerical example, which facilitates for them, a profit excess of 50 ~ch, if both of them
do not exercise any care. Both can alternatively utilize the care of zero, 2 or 4. By this, on
the whole, nine possible combinations of care level are obtained. The profits, the expected
damages and the profit excesses minus the damages are listed in the following Table.
TABLE 3
b8
c9
victim
a

a100
IIOverall
III
19 a 82
14
86
16
20
98
84
85
80
10
15
96
12 84
Overall
96
9885
94
96
92
9483
including
damages
damages
profits

I
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If the culprit and victim do not take any care, a common profit of 100 occurs in case
of the combined care levels 1 and a. This is obtained from the arbitrary assumption, that
each one achieves a profit of 50 by means of his economic activity. With this
combination, we obtain damages of 20 (see Column II) and an overall profit excess of 80
(Column III). The other values in Table 3 are obtained at the culprit and victim, in each
case, take higher levels of care. Column III of the Table shows that the culprit has to
utilise care level b and care level 2 in order to achieve a socially optimal state. Each or
the combination of diligence is inefficient

Efficiency

of liability

rules

For further analysis, it is important to make it clear that the effects of a liability
regime decisively depend upon the expectations in case of bilateral damage causing, such
of which are mutually conceptualized between the culprit and the victim with regard to the
expenditure involved io damage prevention.
First of all, let us consider the victim's liability again. The culprit 'will not take the
trouble to exercise any care and realize his lowest level of care: 1. The victim will base
his expectations upon this. It is advantageous for him to ensure an over-optimal level of
care: 3. Because only by this, he can reduce the damages posed to him by 4 as against the
socially efficient care level by an extra expenditure of 2. The total damage prevention
expenditure in the example, with 4, is precisely so high as in case of optimal damage
control. But the control does oot have the highest possible efficiency. This is because the
entire preventive expenditure is not properly distributed between the culprit and victim.
The total profit of the culprit and victim, with 82, is lower by 4 than in case of efficient
damage control.
The negligence liability in case of bilateral damage-causing
consideration of the legally prescribed contributory negligence
dependent on it, "as to what extent the damage has been Caused
This rule makes it possible for the court to involve the victim
damages, which can lie anywhere between zero and one hundred

should be analysed under
which makes the liability
by one or the other party."
with a part in the overall
per cent

Initially, we shall now examine such a case here, in which the court can successfully
arrive at the efficient care level for both parties, can statutize it by jurisdiction and convert
it into a suitable liability rule. In the present example, the courts would prescribe the care
levels 2 and b and in case this level is not transgressed, they would fix the liability
including contributory negligence by a party in such a manner, that each gets an incentive
for exercizing the efficient diligence. In case, for example, both parties do not exercise any
care whatsoever, we would obtain in the example in Table 3, a damage of 20 as against
the optimum damage of 10. The damage of 10 which is to be included in the liability
might then have to be shared by both the culprit as well as the victim. Since each of both
has to be caused to utilise 2 resource units, a contributory negligence quota. which lies
between 20% and 80%, is efficient A higher quota would cause the culprit, and a lower
quota would cause the victim to stick to the lowest care level. In case of a correct
specification of the contributor'} negligence quota and the optimal combination of
precaution by the courts, the negligence liability is, therefore, quite efficient.
It is once again pointed out that there is an important speciality of bilateral damage
causing. If we assume in the example, that the victim does not exercise any care, (care
level 1) and the culprit is aware of this, then the culprit would still be exempted from
liability despite his knowledge of the carelessness of the victim, if he undertakes the
otherwise usuallegallj required care. Based on the said example, he would then arrive at
care level b. But this does not result in efficiency in the sense of the economic theory of
the second best, if one, for example, assumes a very low care level by the victim. Because
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now, it would be socially better, overall, if the culprit would have had an incentive of

making use of 4 resources units from it instead of 2. The overall profit would thus be
magnified, as we can see from Column III in Table 3. This second best result can thus
cause the jurisdiction to increase the care level of the culprit for this case.
The American judicial system reacts very flexibly to a reduction of care expenditure
by the victim. In the sense of the second best, then, the victim has to raise his care level
according to the Learned Hand criterion, to an efficient level, in order to escape a liability.
Thus a car driver in the United States, who neglects to raise his care level against a
pedestrian who crosses the road head-on against the traffic, despite the traffic lights, and
does not slam on the brakes for the so-called "last clearing chance", will still be held
liable. Although the car drivers have an incentive to stick to their care level, anyhow the
pedestrians are deprived to the extent, the incentive for exercizing their own care, as the
extent to which the car drivers are held jointly liable.
In the Germa.'1 judiciary, there is the so-called principle of faith. According to this,
the car driver trusts the pedestrians to follow the traffic rules and is not held liable, if he
does not exhibit careful behaviour, 'given the reckless behaviour of the pedestrian. The
reimbursement of expenses incurred should, in these cases however, constitute not only
the material expenditure, but also the complete opportunity costs of the culprit. As far as
possible, it should even go beyond these costs, so that, apart from solely the cost
compensation, it should offer an incentive to equalize the exercise of care of the victim,
which is too meagre.
What is the effect of the negligence liability with the contributory negligence of the
victim, if the courts are not successful in specifying the optimal standards of diligence for
both parties, since they do not have the necessary information with them or do
consciously deviate from the efficiency criterion? The question regarding the effects,
which would then become apparent, can only sketchily be answered here. In doing so,
four case groups can be differentiated:
(1) The expenditure for care is specified to be too high for both, the culprit aM the
victim. Then there is a tendency for the concerned parties, to still achieve the correct level
of care. Let us assume that in the example in table 3, the courts demanded the care level
'c' from the culprit and the care level '3' from the victil 1. Both should mus utilise 4
resourc~ units to ward off damage, almough each of two units would be optimal. But bom
have an incentive to utilize only me optimum care level if in a process, me damage
difference of between me culprit and me victim made valid, is divided approximately into
half. Then bom have, an advantage of having economized two units of resources. Thus,
me culprit has to pay a damage compensation of 1 and has an advantage of 1 in
comparison to the state in which he maintains me judicial care standard. The same holds
good for the victim, who saves 2 units of preventive expenditure, suffers a damage of 2
and of mis, he receives compensation for half me quantity. This result, however, depends
on me fact that the contributory negligence regulation is introduced in the sense of the
allocrotion efficiency.
(2) The expenditure of care is set too low for both, culprit and victim. In this case,
the culprit will have to bear this low expenditure. The victim on me other hand, gets an
incentive to utilise an over-optimum level of care. If me courts, for example, would
prescribe me combination 1 with 'a' for the care level, me culprit would also control this
sub-optimal level, since he is already exempted from the liability at this level. The
victim, on the other hand, would raise his expenditure either to the levels 2 or 3. This is
because in this manner, he can reduce the damages falling to his account. The
misdirection of the court would be corrected by the compensating behaviour of the victim
partly in the sense of the theory of the second best. But an overall optimal result would
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not arise or would arise only by coincidences of a particular relation between damage and
damage prevention costs.
(3) The care level is specified.to be too high for the culprit and specified too low for
the victim:-in the example, the approximate combination I, 'c'. Even here, this may
result in compensating reactions in the direction of higher efficiency. In the above
example, the culprit is going to retain his over-optimal level of care, in order to get
exempted from liability in case of a damage of 12. Then the victim would get the
incentive to control the care level 2. By an extra expenditure of 2, he can thus reduce his
damages to be borne by himself by 3.
(4) The care level is specified to be too low for the culprit, and too high for the
victim. Here, the culprit has no incentive to raise his very low level, because he is
e..<emptedfrom liability even without this. The victim is then going to behave in such a
manner, that he maximizes his profits in the sense of the second best. He will be
spending more on preventive measures than is socially optimal.
We can summarize that in case of a wrong, i.e. inefficient specification of care levels
by the courts, the efficient solution can still be reached, if the requirements of care for
both sides are expanded and the correct use of the contributory negligence rule is made. In
all other situations, there is certainly a tendency of the participants in the legal process, to
deviate from the rule with increasing efficiency, without, on the whole, efficiency being
achieved.
Let us study the controlling effect of absolute liability. It is evident, that an absolute
liability without contributory negligence is only the reciprocal case of victim's liability
and in this manner, it is inefficient. It leads to an over-optimal care level of the culprit
and to carelessness on the part of the victim.
An absolute liability with contributory negligence is, however, efficient if the courts
correctly specify the care level of the victim and if required, they also specify the
contributory negligence quota in such a manner, that both sides get adequate incentives.
This can be clearly illustrated in the example in Table 3. Let us assume that the culprit
exercises what is for him, an optimal care of 2, the victim, on the other hand, exhibits no
care, thus a damage of 15 is obtained. In this case, the victim ought to bear damage
. expenditure himself, which is greater than 2 and lesser than 5. Then both culprit and
victim get an incentive to maintain the optimal care level. If the care standard of the
victim is specified to be too low by the court, it impairs the efficiency of the absolute
liability, because the victim will control the low level of care, whereas the culprit now
raises his care level over the optimal level in a compensating manner. In the sense of the
second best, this may be efficient, but the socially optimal combination of diligence
efforts is not reached.
If the care requirements for the victim are specified to be too high and
correspondingly, upon negligence of his high care level, high risk of the victim are
specified, then the victim will be very careful and the culprit, on the other hand, will
exercise very little care.
On the whole, we can be sure that in case of bilateral damage control, not only the
negligence liability but also the absolute liability, respectively supported by the
contributory negligence defence, is efficient because of exercising of care by both, the
culprit and the victim. However, this holds good only if the courts are successful in
correctly recognising the mutually efficient damage prevention level, convert it into
precise instructions and furthermore, offer incentives on the socially useful behaviour on
the utilization of the contributory negligence rule. If the the care levels are mutually overexpended in case of the negligence liability, the optimal combination of care and damage
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utilization

of the contributory

negligence rule. In the rest of the cases of wrongly specified expenditures on care, as a
rule, efficient damage influence is not achieved. However, compensating reactions of the
involved actor do occur, which, in the sense of the economic theory of the second best,
raise the care to a more efficient level than the one prescribed by the courts.

B.2 Accident prevention by means
one-sided activity level control

of a mutual

care level control

and

The analysis of two-sided care level control and one-sided activity level control is the
most general class of legal cases for which one more efficient regime exists amongst the
really existing liability systems.
Let us now return to a widely mentioned example:
On New Year's Eve, the resident of cities are constantly endangered by fIrework
rockets being fIred all around them. They have to live with this danger. They have no
possibility of getting out of the danger by reducing may be a level of activity at home or
of daily life. Thus we shall presume here as a deviation from the original example-they
can escape from the rockets flying all around them by avoiding the areas being exposed to
the explosions. That is to say, they can avoid being present in the direction vicinity of
the place being used to fIre rockets. The people releasing the fireworks themselves are in a
position to control both in the care level and activity level, in which they, on the one
hand, decide about the precautionary measures per rocket fIred and on the other hand, on
the number of rockets fIred too.

Method

of observation

based on economics

The economically efficient state is achieved, if the care level of the potential victim
as well as the care level and activity level of the fIrework releasers are directed to a sphere
of action, which restricts both parties to fulfIl the Learned Hand criterion and further
expects from the fireworks releasers the undertaking of an activity expansion only for so
long as the consequentially induced profit growth exceeds the damage growth.

Efficiency

of liability

rules

Which of the really existing liability regime guarantees the maintenance of the three
efficiency demands?
The victim's liability is not the solution. It cannot be influenced either the care level
or the activity level of the culprits ..
Each type of negligence liability is similarly unsuitable, because the rocket launcher
of the New Year's Eve can constantly escape an ominous liability, in that he points out
that he has fulfilled the efficient obligations of care. Thus he can, while maintaining the
legally prescribed care obligation, unrestrictedly expand his activity level-that
is, the
number of firecrackers released. This results in an increase of a residual sum of damage,
for example, by a wind current of sparks from skyrockets, causing a fIre, to an increase of
such a damage, which one meaningfully does not avoid by means of preventive measures.
This is because they are too expensive with regard to their damage-reducing potential.
The absolute liability, on the other hand, is suitable to control both care as well as
the activity of the culprit to the economically active level. Since the fireworks releaser is
himself responsible for the damages caused in connection with his actions, he will meet
all such damage prevention expenses to such an extent as these are exceeded by the
damage reduction achieved (Learned Hand criterion). Efficient care is thus taken. The
futility of getting exempted from a continuing liability for residual damages by an
efficient exercise of care can further drive the fireworks releaser to fire one more rocket in
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order to balance the resultant rise in the sum of liability with the profit growth. Also, the
activity level is efficiently controlled. However, the absolute liability cannot control the
achievement of optimal damage reduction incentives-in the form of the Learned Hand
criterion-for
the potential victim. This dispenses with any measures of care as against
firework items with the knowledge of a complete liability of damage of the culprit
The weakness of the absolute liability can, however, be compensated by the
contributory negligence defence. The firework releaser should, then, always be able to get
exempted from complete liability, if the victim has undertaken sub-optimal measures for
care, in which for example, no sufficient safe distance has proved to be useful against the
firecrackers. With the knowledge of this individual liability, the victim will always
exercise efficient care. But similarly, the culprit will also undertake an efficient activity
and care level,_ because due to the care taken by the victim himself, he also has to
constantly expect a full liability for damage caused. Thus the absolute liability with the
contributory negligence defence, is the sole, remaining efficient liability regime.
The efficiency of the absolute liability modified by contributory negligence naturally
requires a specification of the legal care obligation of the victim to the extent prescribed
by the Learned Hand criterion. A comprehensive care obligation of the victim results in
very high care measures and a very low obligation of care results in a very low degree of
safety measures. Whether or not the above-mentioned option of absolute liability is
efficiently brought into action, does lastly depend upon the competence of the courts to
specify in an economically optimal manner, the care obligations in their extent.

B.3 Accident
control

prevention

by mutual

control

of care and activity

level

The possibility of bilateral care and activity level control represents the most
generalized case of discussion. With this, we can clearly demonstrate as to how the civil
action liability regime and governmental regulation have to closely co-ordinate together,
in order to facilitate an efficient balance of interfering activity.
Each of the examples discussed here, for that matter, each case of damage contains an
element ot bilateral damage prevention and bilateral activity control in its core. 'Thus the
roofer, for example, can reduce his roof-laying activity, in which he reroofs only a part of
his roof. The pedestrians passing below can undertake safety measures, they can wear a
hard hat, and they can also reduce the number of their walking trips. The same ideas are
valid for the rest of the examples. But it is important to recollect such an instrument of
damage prevention, which is of decisive importance for the tune of the damage. In the
example, of the roofer, this is the care exercised by him. His level of activity can be
allowed to vary only within narrow limits and can therefore, hardly exert any influence on
.the extent of damage. The same holds good for the pedestrians. The activity and care
levels of the pedestrians only insignificantly affect the cause of the damage. For this
reason, they are ignored.
Conversely, there are situations available, in which all instruments of damage control
have an approximately equal range of importance for the tune of damage, and therefore,
have to be wholly included. This is what takes place, for example between the conflicting
activities of car driving and motorbike riding. Exercising of care by the car drivers and
motorbike riders is of equal importance just as the tune of damage for a given amount of
care significantly depends on the extent of car driving and motorbike riding.

Method

of observation

based on economics

From the overall social viewpoint, a liability system should be formulated, which is
simultaneously in a position to control the exercise of care of motorbike drivers and car

..
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to the Learned Hand criterion, as well as to restrict the exercise to

activity of both parties to a level to which the exercising of another activity unit results
in an increase of damage, which exceeds the profit growth of the actor.
Efficiency

of

liability

rules

We know from the previous discussions that the absolute liability with contributory
negligence defence is in a position to control the activity level of the party subject to
absolute liability and both levels of preventive care. The question remains to be answered
as to whether even the second level of activity-in
case of the car drivers subjects to
absolute liability: that of the motorbike rider-is efficiently controlled. The answer is:
No.
The motorbike rider is exempted from the contributory negligence by fulfilling his
obligations of care, and thus, he can, without fearing any liability, expand his activity
level unhindered. For the most general case of bilateral damage prevention and activity
control, there exists no efficient liability regime.
But this does not mean that in this case, all liability regimes are unsuitable to the
same extent. The absolute liability with the contributory negligence defence remains the
so-called "second best" if mainly, importance is given to regulate the activity level of the
culprit. The negligence liability with contributory negligence defence becomes the second
best, if a regulation of the activity scope of the victim yields the largest contributions for
damage limitation.
If we expand our perspectives beyond the horizon of civil action liability systems,
then we obtain possibilities of filling in the functional lacunae of the liability regime.
The wide area of governmental regulation is appealing. Taxes, duties, biddings and
prohibitions are the additional instruments of harmonization of individual and overall
social interests. If, for example, a vehicle tax is imposed on motorbike riders which
proportionally' increases with the number of annual driven kilometers and whose
kilometer count, in each case, precisely corresponds to the rise of the residual damage sum
per extra kilometer travelled, provided that both parties have behaved carefully to an
efficient level, then even the motorbike rider has an incentive to efficiently adjust his
activity level. Such concepts however, can mostly be put into practice only with
difficulty, because significant information and control problems with respect to the
relevant parameters crop up (e.g. residual damage sum).
However, governmental regulation is quite suitable to equalize the functional defects
of civil action liability systems. Right now, environmental politics is domain of
government regulation instruments. The problems of operationality of a civil action
liability which crop up here due to incomprehensible
and unassigned cause-effectrelationships can be properly solved by the courts. It is important in the analysis of
individual problems to constantly maintain an overview of civil action liability regimes
and of possible regulation systems. This facilitates the selection of suitable combination
of instruments, which enables such an efficient individual behaviour.
The problem of bilateral care and activity control discussed here can, however be
solved solely by resorting to civil action liability. This is so, when the courts define an
excessive activity level as negligent: If negligence and contributory negligence could be
defined in terms of levels of activity as well as levels of care, then the usual liability rules
would lead injurers and their victims to choose optimal levels of care and of their
activity.l Whether or not a negligence test of the activity level is at all possible in court
practice, remains undecided.

I.
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and risk attitudes

relationships

The previous discussions had been based under the expressive precondition of
prohibitively high transactional costs, which exclude any proceedings, contractual
relationships, or commercial relationships between the culprit and the victim before the
damage-causing action. If we dispense with this precondition, then the economic analysis·
of liability rules become significantly complicated. This is because markets with their
specific fUnctional conditions and lacunae have to be studied. In contrast, in case of a
perfectly functioning market, the type of liability rule is neutral, corresponding to the
Coase-theorem. Victim's liability, negligence liability or absolute liability uniformly
result in efficiency. Even the faulty specification of demands requiring careful behaviour
made by the co~ts does not impair the realization of an efficient extent of damage by
suitable care and activity levels. The research on economic analysis of law has involved
the study of various problem areas in which the preconditions of the Coase-theorem do
not exist. In case of asymmetrically distributed information costs between the culprit and
the victim, a market failure may occur, (Akerlof 1970). Dangerous, useless and healthendangering products or one-side impairing general business conditions can generally
pervade the market. In these cases, tremendous importance is attached to liability rules.
Moreover, it could be demonstrated that even in case of asymmetric costs, the
retrievability of purchases and the communication amongst the customers can correct
falsely specified liability rules through the market. However, in many cases, the area of
asymmetric information costs remains the starting point for the formulation of liability
rules. This holds good for the guarantee law as well as for production liability law and for
the law of general business conditions.
Risk

attitudes

The economic analysis of law derives the efficiency of liability rules mostly under
the explicitly or implicitly assumed premise of risk neutrality. According to this, the
participants are interested in the legal procedures of "maximizing the wealth". A profit of
one hundred DM with a probability of fifty per cent is of the same value for the riskneutrals as a profits of one thousand with a probability of five per cent. If we introduce
risk aversion on the side of the injurer or the victim or in both cases, then we obtain a
difference between the maximizing of the expected wealth and of the expected profit. As
to what extent the inclusion of risk aversion should affect the accident law, is, however,
still an open question. The risk-averse injurer has a special interest in limiting his
liability or the insurance procedures. If a risk cannot be insured, the limitation of the
liability of a risk-averse injurer can also be socially, overall efficient. Let us assume, that
the transport of poisonous chemicals is efficient, although it inevitably results in
accidents with very high costs even in case of optimal care and activity levels of the
transport agency. Let us further assume that for all damages caused, a strict and unlimited
liability is fixed and the extent of the accident is very high in case of very small
, probability of an accident. Let us finally assume that no insurance cover is possible, then
the transport agency would not undertake the job in the face of the existence-endangering
risks, although the expected value of its liability losses may be low. The consequence is
not necessarily a limitation of the liability through its upper limits. Restricting the
liability in case of risk-averse injurers and non-insurable damages can be done by the
judicial system, using various formulas, which are outside the actual damage suit. Thus
the civil action liability can be formulated withoUllimiLS, whereas the social law enables
us to limit the liability to the social capacity. Limitations of the scope of enforcement
represent another such possibility.
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